zational strategies of local actors. This process of hybridization is evident in an exemplary way in foreign aid projects that are dedicated to strengthening women's NGOs.
Western organizations arrive in post-socialist countries expecting local women to embrace discourses about women that derives from Western feminism and emphasize "women's rights." But as Gal and Kligman have noted, these discourses do not match local understandings of women's civic activity, which are articulated through notions of maternal self-sacrifice and nation building. 6 It is this poor fit between foreign and local understandings of women's roles that has had important consequences for the effects of foreign programs on civil society and on new postsocialist women's organizations.
Prior to 1989, there were almost no NGOs in the conventional sense in Ukraine, and nonstate women's organizations were in their infancy. A complex field of new women's associations has since emerged. Most of these groups view women's activism as an extension of maternal nurturing. Yet U.S. aid practices have not, on the whole, supported any of these groups. They have instead encouraged the proliferation of new organizational forms and discourses that I call "hybrid feminisms." Although they adopt some elements of the foreign models that Western actors promote, they differ in significant respects both from foreign and from local models of women's activism. Furthermore, taken as a group, hybrid NGOs dedicated to women and women's issues require us to blur the supposed boundaries between governmental and nongovernmental organizations, between for-profit and not-for-profit enterprises, between "maternalist" (or traditional women's activism) and activism based on "feminist" principles. These hybrid feminist associations receive most of the support that foreign foundations and foreign women's rights projects have devoted to integrating women into civic life in Ukraine. The effect of hybrid feminist associations is doubly ironic. They fail to support the locally inspired, maternalist groups that have prolif-
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erated at every level of civil society, and they also fail to resemble Western feminist models of grassroots women's empowerment. This analysis focuses on several kinds of women's organizations that have resulted from the encounter between foreign aid and local organizing in Ukraine. Most were created unintentionally by an elite of expert organizers I call "foundation feminists." Foundation feminists are women who are highly educated and speak English. They were hired to work as staff and advisors on U.S. projects to foster grassroots women's activism. They set in motion practices that, over time, drained personnel and resources away from existing local women's organizations. The women's rights projects organized by these foundation feminists have undermined local groups or complicated the relationship between local constituencies and foreign funders. The result has been that programs funded by the United States and aimed at strengthening civil society have provided virtually no financial support to grassroots women's voluntary associations. Instead, they have triggered intense competition for funding and legitimacy among existing grassroots associations and have encouraged professionalism among foreign-oriented civic activists. In the process, NGOs funded from abroad have become increasingly distant from local civic life, even though most of the programs proposed by foreign advisors were intended to stimulate grassroots civic participation and build local associations.
To understand the practices that have led to these unintended outcomes, I conducted extensive interviews and field observations in Ukraine and Washington, D.C. From December 1998 to January 1999, I interviewed the founders, advisors, and staff of the NIS-US (New Independent States of the Former Soviet Union-United States) Women's Consortium, the largest of the partnerships concerned with women's rights that are funded by the U.S. government in the former Soviet Union. 7 I focused on how my interviewees became involved in U.S.-funded assistance to women's NGOs in Ukraine, what were their goals and methods of work, and who were their local partners. From February to August 2001, I explored the same themes among U.S.-funded and locally funded women's NGOs in Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Lviv. I interviewed foreign donors, local staff of foreign-funded projects, and representatives of more than sixty women's organizations. I also attended meetings, protest rallies, conferences, and other public events; reviewed one foreign-funded organization's grant records; read mission statements, final reports, and analyses of women's activism; and had informal conversations on a regular basis with recipients of various forms of foreign aid.
8 During fall 2001, I worked in Washington, D.C., interviewing the staff of projects that are funded by the U.S. government and that manage democracy aid to Ukraine.
My analysis begins by discussing the forms of women's activism that have emerged locally since the final years of Soviet rule. After this, I turn to the models of women's activism that U.S.-government-funded organizations intended to promote in Ukraine. Next, I examine the backgrounds of the foundation feminists, the main agents of hybrid feminism. Then I turn to three different hybrid feminist organizations that resulted from different kinds of foreign aid. I show how each departs in important respects from foreign as well as local understandings of feminism and women's activism. The first is a transnational network, La Strada, that arose in response to antitrafficking initiatives. The second consists of NGOs that operate projects to promote women's entrepreneurship. The third is an "empowerment" and education program that works closely with international agencies. I conclude by suggesting that the ultimate success of local women's associations depends on building coalitions between the various kinds of activism I have described.
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Women's activism in contemporary Ukraine
Tens of thousands of new civic groups have formed in Ukraine since the late eighties. Ever-increasing numbers consider themselves to be women's organizations (in Ukrainian, Zhinochi orhanizatsii).
9 Roughly two dozen groups explicitly seek to raise the status of women as a group. These include several organizations of women entrepreneurs or professionals and a number of groups that define themselves as feminist. But generally, most women's groups work primarily on issues related to families or children and view women's activism as an extension of maternal nurturing.
Women's groups vary greatly in their organizational structure, visibility, size, and scope. Local scholars categorize the most publicly visible women's groups as "traditional" women's organizations to indicate that these groups do not wish to challenge the local gender system. 10 This designation is apt. It also offers a useful introduction to the understandings these groups have of the kind of women's activism they promote. Women's groups nearly all attach a positive value to motherhood, femininity, and what they view as "traditional" gender relations.
11 They do not see their maternal and family duties as sources of their primary grievances. Most associate foreign projects that talk of "women's rights" and "overcoming patriarchal traditions" with false promises the party leadership made in the socialist era.
12 All but a small minority Soviet state institutions assumed the right to speak on behalf of women, and official Soviet women's associations promoted the interests of the Communist Party above those of women. As a consequence, Soviet politicians and women came to believe that "an indeidentify such phrases with "feminism" and reject it as a foreign movement that seeks to drive women and men apart. They believe that Ukraine's problems will be solved by reviving (rather than rejecting) Ukraine's tradition of strong families and equality between men and women. 13 Because of these negative associations, most women's groups in Ukraine avoid using the terms women's rights and feminism (femynizm in Ukrainian, feminizm in Russian). Instead, they embrace a "maternalist" discourse in which it is understood that women's civic roles should focus on the welfare of children and families and on the restoration of Ukrainian traditions. , 1996) . My research suggests that these figures probably include members who were no longer active by the midnineties. 17. In May 1993, the Women's Community organized the conference "Women in State Building" ("Zhinka v derzhavotvorenni"). Papers assessed women's representation in state and government structures as well as in other areas of society. At the conference's close, a resolution was passed that urged the president, Parliament, and Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine to introduce gender quotas to guarantee the equal representation of women in the Parliament and in the government. The Women's Community went on to organize further conferences on women's political and legal status. It coordinated legal campaigns on behalf of equal rights legislation and constitutional guarantees of equality. In addition, the Women's Community formed a bloc of ten women's organizations to support the candidacy of fifty women running for office in the 1994 parliamentary election campaigns. The following year, the head of the Women's Community spoke on the need for expanding women's
The Union of Ukrainian Women has operated most actively in Western Ukraine. The Union was founded there during the interwar period. But it ceased to exist when the Soviet state annexed this region during World War II. The Union seeks to restore Ukrainian traditions of the pre-Soviet era. One of its main aims is to revive the pre-Soviet Ukrainian women's movement. 18 Local chapters have sponsored publications, libraries, museum exhibits, conferences, and other educational activities that raise awareness of Ukrainian women who played a prominent role in preSoviet public life. They also coordinate charitable activities to assist orphans, gifted children, senior citizens, veterans, and other needy groups. In addition, they organize local cultural and educational events celebrating Mother's Day as well as national holidays and dates of historical significance.
The Spilka Zhinok Ukrainy (Confederation of Women of Ukraine) is another prominent federated women's organization that adopts a largely maternalist agenda. The Confederation is the formal successor to official Soviet women's organizations called Women's Councils. A 1987 party edict created the Women's Councils. 19 Official reports claimed that one year later there were Women's Councils in every major workplace, with nearly half a million members overall. However, the organization existed primarily on paper, had no budget, and attracted little public interest or grassroots involvement. 20 When Ukraine became independent, the Women's Councils were reformed and adopted their current name. The Confederation has engaged in charitable activities and commemorations of International Women's day as well as in campaigns to strengthen women's legal rights. and other civic organizations to build a vibrant civil society in Ukraine. Among foreign donors, U.S. "civil society" projects have provided most of the foreign funding devoted to the development of local women's organizations in Ukraine. 23 The Open Society Institute and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) have been the sources of most funding for local women's projects and most direct grants to local women's organizations. 24 Next in importance are the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), followed by the European Union's Technical Aid to the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS) Program.
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All these donors share a particular model of civic activism. They have repeatedly claimed to build civil society through local projects that create horizontal relationships between local and foreign voluntary organizations variously called "partners" or "counterparts." Policy makers believed that such initiatives to forge "partnerships," "alliances," "consortiums," and "networks" between local and American voluntary associations would "enhance the capabilities of local grassroots NGOs in the NIS." In the words of an early USAID report that set the agenda for future U.S. partnerships in Russia and Ukraine (and later, for other postSoviet countries), Similarly, program statements at USAID all stressed that partnerships between Ukrainian and American NGOs were the most important factor in the effort to "move countries of Europe and Eurasia far enough along the transition path that they could enter normal economic and political relations with other countries and complete the journey on their own." 26 USAID viewed such partnerships as valuable to democratization and as more "cost-effective" than conventional foreign aid projects. 27 As a result, a broad range of shorter-term USAID women's projects adopted the "network" organizational model. The networks they formed were operated either through USAID contracts with U.S. development agencies or through programs USAID developed jointly with U.S. foundations. I first examine partnership projects USAID itself initiated, then I turn to foundation-based partnerships, and last, to joint USAID-foundation-funded projects.
The NIS-US Women's Consortium was one of the first partnership projects funded by USAID. Supported from 1992 until 1999,
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Hybrid assistance programs and field missions were being designed and implemented, women's rights were a low priority. In November 2001, I interviewed two U.S. ambassadors to Ukraine and the Ukraine program staff of the National Security Council, the National Democratic Institute, International Republican Institute, and the National Endowment for Democracy (the main democracy assistance providers in Ukraine). My interviewees revealed that U.S. programs were encouraged to place highest priority on conventional security issues, followed by broader economic and political development. Women's rights and other issues received much less institutional support and funding within foreign aid programs overall. They remained the jurisdiction of planning units such as USAID's Office of Women in Development. Such planning units are small, relatively weak, and understaffed. Even more than most USAID divisions, women's programs were under great pressure to identify less expensive types of projects.
it promised to link "women's groups in the Newly Independent States of the former Soviet Union with their counterparts in the West to share information and experiences"; to "provide leadership training, economic empowerment and job skills training, capacity building for nongovernmental organizations and information necessary for local women's NGOs to advocate for policy change"; and to raise a range of issues "from legal issues, prevention of domestic violence, and human rights to entrepreneurial skills and business management." 28 Local women's organizations were also included as target groups for several other projects that operated across borders and were financed by USAID. Counterpart's Alliance for Partnership described itself as a "social partnership" with Ukraine and Belarus and promised to "give citizens a voice in their own development" through "partnership and mutual investment in community development among NGOs, business and government." 29 The US-Ukraine Foundation's Community Partnership Project aimed to "link" Ukrainian and U.S. "partnership cities" to "support grassroots and constituent-driven reform."
30 Another networking project USAID funded was the International Research and Exchanges Board Civil Society Program, which "works in partnership with indigenous groups" and "promotes community activism through increased volunteerism, grassroots initiatives and information campaigns." 31 These endeavors were explicitly aimed at strengthening or "empowering" women's groups that were to be "local," "grassroots," or based in "communities." USAID defined empowerment as "getting people to believe in themselves, to rely less on government to guide their daily lives, and to take control of their destiny through economic opportunities and political choice." 32 USAID developed women's initiatives that offered three main kinds of empowerment. Projects to promote "NGO development" offered lessons in fund-raising, leadership, and conflict management. Those devoted to "women's leadership" aimed to prepare women to speak about gender inequality, domestic violence, and sexual harassment as well as other problems women face as the result of patriarchal traditions. Finally, "economic empowerment projects" trained women to become entrepreneurs. U.S. foundations also funded "network" projects. Open Society Institute was the largest foreign foundation to provide consistent funding for various women's rights networks. In 1990, Open Society opened a branch office in Ukraine, called the International Renaissance Foundation, that would become Ukraine's first major Western donor. It was also the first to support women's rights and gender equality. The Foundation's Civil Society Program coordinated Ukraine's first gender equality seminars. These were devoted to "women's rights as human rights." This program was also the first to fund travel to international women's rights conferences and to provide small grants for NGO development and publication of feminist literature.
In 1995, the Open Society Institute restructured its gender project. The result was Women in Society, a program whose main goal was to develop a "strong network of Ukrainian women's NGOs." 33 This network project aimed to encourage women's organizations to unite and place pressure on the Ukrainian government to develop national gender policy and new laws that protect women's rights, eliminate discrimination, and widen women's participation in policy decision-making process on regional, local, and national levels. To achieve this goal, Women in Society funded local NGOs that promised to assist in developing and strengthening Ukrainian NGOs, supported cooperation between women's organizations on national and international levels, and widened access of Ukrainian NGOs to international resources and women's organizations on an international level. 34 Women in Society also launched several other projects, including one aimed at strengthening Ukrainian women's civic organizations, particularly those that helped women in crisis (e.g., hot-
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Hybrid Feminisms in Post-Socialist Ukraine lines, counseling centers, battered women's shelters). This project also provided training in grant writing to local civic organizations and even provided money to allow them to purchase equipment such as computers, printers, and fax machines.
Another project of Women in Society sought to integrate principles of gender equality into secondary school and university curricula. Grants were provided for translating Western feminist literature and related women's rights materials into Ukrainian or Russian, for publishing original feminist scholarly works, and for developing course materials that would be taught in gender and women's studies courses. In addition, this project provided small grants and sponsored competitions to encourage scholars as well as students to conduct and publish research on gender discrimination. It funded local after-school programs and summer camps aimed at teaching gender sensitivity to school-age children.
Women in Society also acted as an organizational center for other foreign donors' "network" projects. Its primary program partners were the UNDP Gender in Development Program and Winrock International, USAID's main contractor working on women's rights. 35 Women in Society, Winrock International, and other foreign donors shared costs and comanaged several women's "empowerment" programs in Ukraine. The largest of these focused on trafficking. Antitrafficking initiatives financed networks of local women's credit unions, women's business incubators, battered women's shelters, women's health providers, and hotlines for victims of violence or abuse. These joint donor projects also resulted in a nationwide network called Women for Women that operated antitrafficking centers throughout Ukraine. These centers offered grant support to local NGOs that provided psychological and job counseling as well as legal, medical, and other services to help women cope with the collapse of the local economy and with other problems, such as domestic abuse.
East European Politics and Societies 83
Foundation feminists: Their backgrounds and connections
Women's projects that are funded by foreign donors proudly boast that their local NGO partners are "grassroots." 36 Yet as I will show, the social group largely in charge of such partnerships has had little experience with "grassroots" activism. I call them foundation feminists. 37 The members of this elite are at the center of foreign aid networks; they are considered by foreign donors to be experts in women's empowerment. They serve as the primary formal gatekeepers of aid to grassroots women's organizations in Ukraine. Yet few members of this group have ever worked with the informal, grassroots community associations that proponents of civil society consider valuable to democratic life at the local level. 38 Most have been trained as gender experts by American foundations and nonprofits and have previous experience working for high-profile organizations of this type based in the United States. Some had also previously worked in Moscow for U.S. government agencies or participated in U.S. government exchanges (e.g., Peace Links, Friendship Forces, the Peace Corps, ACDI-VOCA [Agricultural Cooperative Development InternationalVolunteers in Overseas Cooperative Assistance]). Others had worked on USAID projects in developing countries, or on projects funded by U.S.-based nonprofits like Planned Parenthood or the League of Women Voters.
The foundation feminists were typically women of local origin who were recent graduates of elite universities. Their life experi-
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Hybrid Feminisms in Post-Socialist Ukraine ence, education, and social status enabled them to embrace USAID's analyses of Ukrainian women's problems. Briefly, this view represented local traditions as the source of women's difficulties because such traditions supposedly denied women a "choice" and silenced their voices in the former Soviet Union.
39
Foundation feminists saw "tradition" as an obstacle. Their acceptance of this idea led to their preference for working with those local staff and local women's groups who also accepted that tradition is oppressive and the source of post-Soviet women's dilemma.
Abramson's description of a similar group in Uzbekistan holds as well for Ukraine. In both countries, the small minority of women who participate in and benefit from international development, especially from NGO projects, is self-selected. They are highly educated elite academics who already resemble their Western counterparts in their views on women and who accept the "simplistic traditional-modern continuum" that many development agencies in practice use. 40 While being the main beneficiaries of this kind of foreign aid, these women and the donor organizations that work with them have been unable and unwilling to accommodate religious beliefs or "traditional" practices in development programs and in projects aimed at building civil society. Thus, although it is true that the U.S. aid agenda for postSoviet countries includes support for freedom of religious expression and human rights, the larger program of development-as-modernization actually undermines the very civil society and freedoms it purports to be aiding.
In Ukraine, the first women who were attracted to foreignfunded feminist activism were elite Russian speakers. Most were graduates of elite universities or academic institutes based in Moscow. Before they were hired by U.S. programs, they were employed either in Moscow or in Kharkiv, a large city in eastern
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39. In the words of the former U.S. Consortium coordinator in Kyiv, "You couldn't use the word 'feminist' right away. And actually the word 'feminist' means different things to different people. I maintain to my Ukrainian friends that being a feminist means that a woman has choices. It doesn't mean that a woman has to be whatever you think all feminists want . . . I guess we had to be really careful with terminology, that was one of the big things I learned working with women" (Phone interview, 11 December 1998).
See David Abramson, "A Critical Look at NGOs and Civil Society as Means to an End in
Uzbekistan" Human Organization 58:3(1999): 240.
Ukraine that is overwhelmingly Russian speaking. These early feminists were generally hostile to the causes and grievances that inspired local women's activism. 41 They tended to see calls to revive religion or the Ukrainian language somewhat as they had been taught to view these subjects in the Soviet educational system, which treated such issues as parochial concerns that would disappear in response to modernization. Several of the most prominent had close family connections to the leadership of the Communist Party or related official groups. Personal and professional relationships connected most of these individuals to academics in Russia. Their relationships and education led them to avoid inviting Ukrainian scholars or activists to their conferences and seminars and to express scorn for Ukrainian women's associations.
The recruitment and training practices of foreign donors attracted a relatively small community of elite individuals to implement their NGO partnerships. Both American employees and their Russian and Ukrainian staff were typically very curious about Western academic feminism and foreign models of activism. But they often had little sympathy for the causes and concerns that inspired the local women's activism that existed locally. They tended to prefer to work with local Ukrainians who shared their understanding of women's issues. The directors and grant recipients of Renaissance Foundation and USAID programs have consequently focused primarily on recruiting other educators and scholars. They rarely took an interest in local maternalists. Indeed, they viewed the dominance of maternalists in Ukraine as evidence of the country's "backwardness" relative to the rest of the world.
The programs run by foundation feminists that were designed to build civil society have had one striking effect. They drained resources and key personnel away from the local groups of citizens who were becoming active in public life "from below." This effect is clearest in the case of the large federated women's organizations that emerged from the independence movement
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Hybrid Feminisms in Post-Socialist Ukraine and challenged local state elites. Since Ukraine's independence, these women's associations have struggled to find the basic resources they need to fund their activities. Few have been able to adapt to the funding priorities and expectations of foreign donors. Only a handful of local chapters of the Soldiers' Mothers Organization of Ukraine, the Lviv chapter of the Union of Ukrainian Women, and the Kyiv and Kharkiv chapters of Women's Community have been able to win occasional foreign grants. In contrast, far more success in fund-raising has been achieved by those former local leaders of the Union of Ukrainian Women and Women's Community who left these maternalist organizations to form their own feminist NGOs that better meet donors' expectations. Indeed, some of the most promising leaders of local chapters of the Union of Ukrainian Women and Women's Community quit working with these volunteer-driven organizations in response to foreign women's rights programs. Several later formed smaller groups that were professional and employed a staff. The career of one prominent former leader of the Kyiv chapter of the Union of Ukrainian Women provides an illustration of one kind of "hybrid feminist" that has been promoted by initiatives from foreign donors. "Anna" is a former leader of a traditional women's association. She is a Russian who moved to Kyiv from a small Russian city to study engineering in the early eighties. She was in her late twenties when she married a local Ukrainian man who was active in the Ukrainian independence movement. Attracted by its commitment to national revival, Anna joined the Union of Ukrainian Women. She gradually learned Ukrainian, and soon she became the leader of the Union's Kyiv chapter. After independence, a disagreement with the group's leadership led her to abandon the organization. Anna later ran three different foreign-funded projects: a resource center, the Ukrainian branch of a U.S.-based women's foundation, and Empowerment Education (a program discussed further below and funded by the Renaissance Foundation and UNDP). Anna's main staff and regional partners are also former leaders of the Union of Ukrainian Women. For instance, her executive director runs a second professional women's NGO jointly with a third former leader of
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the Kyiv chapter of the Union of Ukrainian Women. Other leaders of the Union of Ukrainian Women also founded NGOs that work exclusively on professionally run, donor-driven projects. One operates a rehabilitation center for handicapped women, another a resource center and a trafficking prevention center. Similarly, two former heads of the Women's Community of Kyiv left this organization and formed their own professionally run organizations that work for international development initiatives. They too no longer participate in the activities of their previous organization.
Numerous grants to develop women's NGOs have gone to this small circle of elite NGO specialists who used to work for "traditional" women's groups affiliated with the independence movement. Many local observers claim that these former "nationalists" are not "real feminists," but rather that they were attracted by the lure of foreign grants and foreign salaries. 42 While most local women's organizations have no funding, elite NGOs such as those that Anna operates attract considerable grants and pay their staff sizeable incomes.
Western aid organizations at first expanded the appeal of Ukrainian projects when they hired Anna and other former independence activists. But such women often went on to behave in ways that undermined the broader goals motivating foreign assistance programs to hire organizers they assumed were in touch with grassroots networks and idioms. For instance, Anna, like the directors of most other foreign-oriented NGOs, considers herself to be a professional with expertise in foreign models of women's empowerment that are superior to local understandings of women's activism. Indeed, all the former leaders of "traditional" women's organizations look down on civic activities that do not conform to the models expected by those who provide foreign assistance. They dismiss as naïve and unsophisticated the causes and tactics embraced by most locally rooted grassroots NGOs. Or worse, they consider these local NGOs to represent the tradi-
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Hybrid Feminisms in Post-Socialist Ukraine tional attitudes that hold Ukraine back in its development. They model their own nonprofits and advocacy groups on foreign assistance projects. Consequently, they sever ties to most other voluntary organizations rather than create them, unless the local organizations conform to the standards set by foreign assistance projects. NGO professionals like Anna offered foreign projects important skills and resources. But they later abandoned their prior civic organizations to work full-time as salaried personnel on foreign assistance projects. They engaged in "voluntary activities" that channel foreign resources and training away from local civic groups and into the coffers of the NGOs this "hybrid feminist" elite operates. When the NGO professionals who left the independence movement offered their services as "volunteers," they rarely worked with local civic organizations. Instead, they typically served on the boards of foreign foundations or foreign grant programs. This same small elite of experts that serve (as volunteers) on foreign program committees also work full-time as salaried grants managers for foreign programs. Typically, foreign grant programs fund only those NGOs that these closed NGO elite operate.
Three hybrid feminist organizations
The three NGOs described here represent three different ways in which the encounter of foreign funders and local activists has created hybrid organizational forms that, over time, have worked to complicate the activities of women in Ukrainian civil society.
Cross-border "grassroots": La Strada
My first example is a hybrid organizational form that foreign support has institutionalized: it is a "network of networks" made up of cross-border women's NGOs.
La Strada Ukraine describes itself as a network of women's centers. It was founded in 1997 by La Strada International Women's Center, another self-described network. La Strada International Women's Center itself was founded by a Netherlands- While other local women's NGOs struggle to make ends meet, La Strada Ukraine receives consistent financial support from the Renaissance Foundation, Winrock International, TACIS, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, and various other international agencies, foreign embassies, foreign foundations, and foreign universities. Yet La Strada has forged no ties to local grassroots organizations. It is run by "Eva," an elite Russian speaker who was one of Ukraine's first feminist scholars. Earlier, she had a feminist organization in Kharkiv that worked closely with elite groups of scholars tied to women's rights initiatives in Moscow. Now her work brings her in closer contact with government actors in Ukraine and with Western women's rights groups.
In Ukraine, La Strada "partnered" with one of Ukraine's only feminist groups, the Humanitarian Initiative Feminist Association of Kharkiv. La Strada hired Eva, the head of Humanitarian Initiative, as its national coordinator. On its grant proposals, La Strada continues to list Humanitarian Initiative as its main local partner in Ukraine. However, once Eva moved from Kharkiv to Kyiv, where La Strada opened its national office, her own organization became inactive. As a consequence, one of Ukraine's first feminist scholars disconnected from local activist and scholarly networks. As La Strada's representative, Eva threw her energy into managing a large international project. Much of this work involved "bringing" to Ukraine foreign models of women's empowerment that promised to solve the country's trafficking problem. 43 In particular, La Strada International tried to combat 90 Hybrid Feminisms in Post-Socialist Ukraine trafficking in Ukraine by introducing foreign organizational forms and practices. It began by creating yet another local women's NGO network, this one aimed at linking hotlines and crisis centers that provided support to trafficking victims through partnerships between La Strada and women's NGOs it described as local. But rather than working with existing hotlines or crisis centers, it established its own new local organizations solely to work on this project. La Strada is not unique in using this strategy. Dozens of foreign programs intended to help women participate in civil society have promoted interorganizational partnerships that use foreign grants to establish a series of new women's NGOs that are represented by their foreign founders as model NGOs that local societies should emulate. Often, however, the solutions these model programs offer are not well adapted to local contexts. Hotlines, for instance, are a good idea in the United States. But they have not yet taken root in Ukraine. One reason may be that most foreign-funded hotlines are located in large cities. As the organization's own research and reports attest, most victims of trafficking are not city girls but teenagers in distant rural areas where phone service is poor and many households share common phone lines. During La Strada's first years, for instance, few potential victims called the hotline to ask for advice or support. The hotline instead tended to receive calls mainly from journalists or from the broader public. Ukraine are government-organized nongovernmental organizations (GONGOs). 45 Government-controlled organizations least resemble ideal types of "grassroots" activism. Nevertheless, they were the first to join the partnerships offered by foreign-funded women's NGO, and they later received the most sizeable foreign funding: grants for developing small and medium enterprises. Ironically, the result was hybrid feminist organizations that blurred several sets of social boundaries that U.S. observers assumed foreign aid would create in Ukraine. Most notably, they failed to clearly distinguish between "state" and "society," and between nonprofit and for-profit sectors. These groups also blurred boundaries between feminism and maternalism, as their public agenda remained predominantly maternalist.
For instance, business development grants that have gone to the Confederation of Women of Ukraine illustrate such a "mixed" solution. In addition, in this case there was a more general problem that the organization funded by foreign donors was in fact controlled by corrupt local or regional political machines and clans. The Confederation was formerly called the Women's Council. It was the most prominent of a large category of women's organizations that were based in former party networks. The Confederation claimed that it became a civic organization when the Soviet Union collapsed and it adopted its present name. But it continued to operate as an extension of the government. Throughout the ten years when Leonid Kuchma was president, the Confederation and a wide variety of similar groups were used to consolidate autocratic rule, launder money, and fix elections. 46 The Confederation was one of the first Ukrainian women's organizations to win a large foreign grant to develop businesses owned by women. Arguably, its close ties to the governing elite helped the group to win several subsequent sizeable foreign grants. The Businesswoman Center that resulted existed for two
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Hybrid Feminisms in Post-Socialist Ukraine be given the power to make a speech on someone's behalf. But what does 'empowered education' mean? These two words just can't be put together." And she would start talking in circles and not explain anything. I didn't understand anything she said.
As this example suggests, foreign donors reward Ukrainian NGOs that employ their language to describe their own chief objectives and to conduct on-the-ground program activities. Such practices create an asymmetry between foreign-funded groups and other local civic organizations by encouraging organizations to frame their advocacy goals in ways that stigmatize or delegitimate popular civic discourses. This practice has increased the distance foundations have created between foreign feminist NGOs and the broader public. It has encouraged most elite women's NGOs to adopt the discourse foreign funders understand. As a consequence, local NGOs run by foundation feminists have not developed a common idiom that is intelligible to other local activists or to the broader public. When there is no local equivalent for a term, then there is a good argument for using foreign women's empowerment terminology. For instance, increasing "gender awareness" or "combating sexism" describe new concepts that are unfamiliar to the public and other local civic associations. There are no obvious terms for these notions in Ukrainian and Russian. However, when foreign funders' discourse is used in reference to civic work more generally, the effects are negative. Rather than speaking the same language as grassroots actors, the elite leaders of hybrid NGOs have adopted a vocabulary that is familiar only to the staff and directors of foreign foundations and foreign programs. Elite NGO leaders frequently refer to their organizations by the English term NGO ("NZhO"), even though they could easily translate "nongovernmental organization" into Ukrainian ("NDO") or Russian ("NGO"), or use the more common term, "civic organization" ("hromads'ka orhanizatsiia" in Ukrainian, "grazhdanskaia organizatsiia" in Russian). Numerous Ukrainian NGOs make many references in their grant applications, final reports, and Web sites to phrases that appear only in foreign grant announcements. For instance, U.S.-funded "civil society" foreign aid, there has been little effort by funders to develop common campaigns with preexisting locally oriented groups. With relatively few exceptions, foreign programs have tended to "partner" with small, single-issue associations that must remove themselves from local civil societies to implement the models of civil society promoted by those who provide foreign assistance. Many of the civic associations that result pursue causes with little local resonance. Indeed, their leaders are often openly hostile to groups that have been able to develop a locally resonant collective action frame.
Foreign assistance programs, and "civil society" programs in particular, have not provided favorable opportunities for building ties among organizations. Such ties are vital if these hybrid feminisms are to have a political impact. Instead of creating a healthy civil society of mutually cooperative women's NGOs, transnational women's rights projects in Ukraine have fueled rivalries among several competing domestic women's networks. Thus, foundation feminists are at odds with the former maternalists who left "nationalist" groups to work in foreign aid initiatives. These two groups are both at odds with women's organizations that were controlled by the Kuchma administration, which are themselves at odds with the "traditional" women's federations that are inspired by maternalist goals. Activists of these many different stripes operate with different aims, and each relies on somewhat different sources of external funding and support. Future coalitions among these many kinds of hybrid feminists are likely to easily break down unless the structure of funding that created these divisions alters considerably.
100
Hybrid Feminisms in Post-Socialist Ukraine
